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Kierkegaard’s Paradoxical Christology 
 
In his introduction to Karl Barth’s early theology, T. F. Torrance writes: 
 
What interests Barth in Kierkegaard’s teaching was the emphasis 
upon the explosive force that the invasion of God in his Godness in 
time and human existence meant, which Kierkegaard sought to 
express by the paradox and dialectic. This is a point that has been 
often misunderstood in both Kierkegaard and Barth––for the 
emphasis upon the infinite qualitative difference between time and 
eternity… was not upon some abstract and distant Deity, but 
precisely upon the nearness, the impact of God in all his Majesty and 
Godness upon man––that is the significance of Jesus that had been 
lost, and which Barth as well as Kierkegaard sought to recover.1 
 
There is a lot going on in Torrance’s mind when he writes this passage––much 
more than can be addressed in this essay. But there is one specific point that I 
would like to focus on and develop: that Kierkegaard’s use of the “infinite 
qualitative difference” and “the paradox” sought to draw attention to the nearness 
of God in Jesus Christ.  
While Torrance is not entirely clear in the above passage, I think his point 
is as follows. Kierkegaard’s and Barth’s shared emphasis on the infinite qualitative 
difference sought to stress, in Kierkegaard’s words, that there is ‘nothing 
whatever’ that human beings can do, in and of themselves, to relate themselves 
directly to God.2 Consequently, it must be ‘God who gives everything; it is he who 
makes a [human being] able to have faith, etc. This is grace, and this is the major 
premise of [Christianity].’3 For both of them, this is the reality of the situation that 
faces us. So, for example, to try to advance an account of the nearness of God by 
asserting a natural synthesis between God and creation would be confused. To 
                                                 
1 Thomas F. Torrance, Karl Barth: An Introduction to his Early Theology - 1910-31 
(London: SCM Press, 1962), 44. 
2 Kierkegaard, Kierkegaard’s Journals and Notebooks, vol. 5, eds. Niels Jørgen Cappelørn, 
Alastair Hannay, David Kangas, Bruce H. Kirmmse, George Pattison, Vanessa Rumble, and 
K. Brian Söderquist (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) (hereafter KJN), 244. 
3 KJN 5, 244. 
discover the truth of God’s nearness to creation, we must look to the only one in 
whom there is full union between God and creation: Jesus Christ. For Kierkegaard, 
 
That the human race is supposed to be in kinship with God is ancient 
paganism; but that an individual human being is God is Christianity, 
and this particular human being is the God-man. 4 
 
This is the significance of Jesus which, as Torrance notes above, ‘had been lost, 
and which Barth as well as Kierkegaard sought to recover.’5 Furthermore, because 
the nearness of this union is entirely unique to the person of Christ, and because 
we cannot comprehend how God could be hypostatically united with humanity, the 
God-humanity of Christ presents itself to us as an absolute paradox. As 
Kierkegaard writes, ‘the God-man is… absolutely the paradox’––a position that 
Barth would come to develop in his own theology.6 As such, the world of Christian 
theology should not treat Christology as a puzzle-solving exercise; the puzzle of 
Christ’s God’s-humanity is not one to which we can offer a solution.  
In sum, “the infinite qualitative difference” served as a term of caution 
against overly systematic attempts to develop a human understanding of the 
relationship between God and creation. Instead, our attention should be directed 
to the paradoxical person of Jesus: the one ‘mediator’ ‘who leads us to God.’7 
 There is much to discuss on this issue with regard to the relationship 
between Kierkegaard and Barth and, indeed, the relationship between Kierkegaard 
and Torrance. In this essay, however, I shall focus on Kierkegaard himself. More 
specifically, I shall concentrate on his paradoxical Christology as a position that 
helps us to understand God’s nearness to humanity. I’ll begin by looking at what 
Kierkegaard has to say about the union between God and humanity in Christ. I 
shall then turn to look at how his paradoxical understanding of the God-human 
relationship helps him to understand two difficult issues in theology: (1) God’s 
relationship to Christ’s suffering; and (2) the changelessness of God. Following this 
                                                 
4 Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity, ed. & trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) (hereafter PC), 82. 
5 Torrance, Karl Barth, 44.  
6 PC, 82. The main place that Barth develops a paradoxical Christology is in the second 
edition of his commentary on Romans. He is open about the fact that this development 
emerged under the influence of Kierkegaard. 
7 Kierkegaard, Journals and Papers, vol. 2, ed. & trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967-78) (hereafter JP), 1432. 
theological reflection, I shall examine the practical role that paradox played in his 
theology. Finally, I conclude by offering a brief account of how Kierkegaard’s 
paradoxical Christology relates to the mediation of Christ––a connection that would 
come to be taken up in the Christocentric theologies of Barth and Torrance. What 
we shall find is that, despite his limited understanding of Kierkegaard, the above 
statement from T.F. Torrance shows a deep appreciation for Kierkegaard’s 
theology on an issue that is often overlooked and, as Torrance puts it, 
misunderstood. 
 
The Paradoxical Union of God and Humanity in Christ 
 
For Kierkegaard, the systematic question of who exactly Jesus Christ is is one that 
needs to be approached cautiously, with a hesitancy to make statements about 
his constitution that go beyond what we are capable of saying. At the same time, 
there are some things that he thinks do need to be said about Christology, and 
we see throughout much of his later authorship. For example, while he maintains 
that Jesus Christ is fully God and fully human, he also insists that we must not 
confuse these two natures––he avoids the suggestion that the incarnation involves 
a synthesis of God and the world.8 Also, he denies that the Son needs to become 
less divine in order to become incarnate––which some kenotic Christologies risk 
suggesting. For Kierkegaard, there is no competitive relationship between 
humanity and divinity; there is no zero-sum game between Christ’s divine and 
human nature, which assumes that his humanity in some way takes away from 
his divinity. Jesus Christ is one person, ‘true God and true man’, ‘the lowly human 
being, yet God, the only begotten of the Father.’9 He ‘is in lowliness and in loftiness 
                                                 
8 For Kierkegaard, the infinite qualitative difference between God and humanity ‘always 
remains.’ JP 2, 1349; see also JP 3, 3087 and JP 1, 236.  
9 PC, 160, 75. As David Law points out, Kierkegaard sometimes associates this union with 
the term Sammensætning (translated ‘placing together’, ‘compound’, ‘composite’). Law, 
Kierkegaard’s Kenotic Christology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 218-9; PC, 81, 
82, cf. 16. However, his use of this term should not be interpreted as suggesting a 
Nestorian tendency in Kierkegaard’s thought. Rather, it is a way of making sure his 
Christology took a firm stand against Christologies that would confuse the divine and 
human nature. As Law also notes, ‘The Nestorian impression created by Sammensætning 
is in any case corrected by Anti-Climacus’ use of the term Eenhed, which makes clear that 
Anti-Climacus holds that the two natures are not merely juxtaposed but are united in the 
Person of Christ.’ 219. (Anti-Climacus is one of Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms. He represents 
an extraordinary Christian. Normally, it is best to draw a clear distinction between 
Kierkegaard and Anti-Climacus. In this essay, however, I have not done this, to try to be 
more straightforward. This is justifiable because Kierkegaard and Anti-Climacus seem to 
one and the same.’ 10 So, when it comes to following Christ, there is no choice 
‘between Christ in lowliness and Christ in loftiness, for Christ is not divided; he is 
one and the same.’11 Humanity and divinity are in union (Eenhed) in Christ.12  
As we mentioned in the introduction, Kierkegaard does not think we can 
know how this could be the case. The logic of the incarnation is beyond human 
comprehension; it is absolutely paradoxical. In holding to this position, he finds 
himself in company with much of Christian orthodoxy. For example, Cyril of 
Alexandria writes: ‘[w]e see in Christ the strange and rare paradox of Lordship in 
servant’s form and divine glory in human abasement.’13 To be clear, an emphasis 
on the paradoxical nature of Christology should not be taken to suggest a logical 
contradiction. Rather, it simply suggests that the notion of Christ’s hypostatic 
union appears contradictory to us in our limited finite understanding. Accordingly, 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of the God-man as absolute paradox seeks to 
emphasize the inability of human beings to possess their own systematic or 
representative understanding of the logic of the incarnation.14 As it is written in 
Timothy 6.16 Christ ‘dwells in inapproachable light, whom no one has ever seen 
or can see’. Or, in Kierkegaard’s words: ‘God dwells in a light from which flows 
every ray that illuminates the world, yet no one can force his way along the paths 
in order to see God since the paths of light turn into darkness when one turns 
toward the light.’15 So, again, the divinity of Christ remains hidden from direct 
human perception. 
At the same time, Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the paradoxical nature of 
Christology should not be taken to be wholly negative. When God assumes 
humanity, God reveals himself to the world in a mode that can be received by 
human beings in faith. This does not mean that everything about God is revealed 
                                                 
hold the same theological position when it comes to the topics discussed in this essay. 
Indeed, Practice in Christianity was originally drafted under Kierkegaard’s own name.) 
10 PC, 161. 
11 PC, 161. 
12 PC, 160. 
13 Cyril of Alexandria, On the Unity of Christ, trans. John McGuckin (Crestwood: St 
Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1995), 101. 
14 PC, 82. It has been well established by C. Stephen Evans (and widely acknowledged in 
Kierkegaard scholarship) that, for Kierkegaard, the paradox is not a formal or logical 
contradiction, but just appears to be so to speculative forms of natural human reason. See 
Evans, Passionate Reason (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992), 97-104; 
Kierkegaard's Fragments and Postscript (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1983), 212-22. 
15 Kierkegaard, Works of Love, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), 9. 
in Christ. There will always be features of God’s inner life that remain hidden to 
us––features that are wholly consistent with his revelation. This is because there 
are qualities that are essential to God that cannot find representation within 
creation. But what it is does mean is that God provides the world with a finite 
object (the humanity of Jesus Christ) through which God full communicates 
himself to creation according to its limits. It is in Christ that God is nearest to 
creation and through Christ that God positively communicates himself to the 
world. By the work of the Holy Spirit, this communication can be received by us 
in faith.16 
To provide a bit more theological context for Kierkegaard’s paradoxical 
theology and show how it finds expression in his broader theology, I shall now 
briefly consider how he holds together the suffering, omnipotence, and 
changelessness of the God-human.  
 
The One Who Suffers Omnipotently 
 
Reminiscent of Cyril of Alexandria’s view of Mary as Theotokos (θεοτόκος),17 
mother of God, Kierkegaard affirms that once God allows himself ‘to be born’, God 
‘has in a certain sense bound himself once and for all’.18 He writes: 
 
[The God-man’s] unrecognizability is so omnipotently maintained that 
in a way he himself is in the power of his own incognito, in which lies 
the literal actuality of his pure human suffering, that this is not merely 
                                                 
16 We do not find much reference to the Holy Spirit in Kierkegaard’s writings. This is 
because of the way in which the Spirit had come to be associated with the Hegelian 
theologies of which he was so critical. That said, he does note that ‘[t]he Spirit brings 
faith, the faith––that is, faith in the strictest sense of the word, this gift of the Holy Spirit.’ 
For Self-Examination, in For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself!, ed. and trans. 
Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 81. Also, he 
maintains that the Spirit must help us to know the Son, the Mediator, who directs us to 
the Father: God ‘becomes my Father in the Mediator by means of the Spirit’. JP 2, 1432. 
17 Cyril asks: ‘How could we confess in the rule of faith that we believe in the Son of God 
who was born of the virgin Mary, if it wasn't the Son of God but the son of man who was 
born of the virgin Mary?’ Serm. 186. 1, Sermons, vi, trans. Edmund Hill (New York: New 
City Press, 1995), 25. 
18 PC, 131. Earlier, Kierkegaard writes: ‘When God chooses to let himself be born in 
lowliness, when he who holds all possibilities in his hand takes upon himself the form of a 
lowly servant, when he goes about defenceless and let people do to him what they will, 
he surely must know well enough what he is doing and why he wills it; but for all that it is 
he who has people in his power and not they who have power over him’. PC, 34. 
appearance but in a certain sense is the assumed incognito’s upper 
hand over him. Only in this way is there in the profoundest sense 
earnestness concerning his becoming true man; this is also why he 
suffers through the utmost suffering of feeling himself abandoned by 
God. He is not, therefore, at any moment beyond suffering but is 
actually in suffering, and this purely human experience befalls him, 
that the actuality proves to be more terrible than the possibility, that 
he who freely assumed unrecognizability yet actually suffers as if he 
were trapped or had trapped himself in unrecognizability…[The divine 
incognito] was maintained to such an extent that [the God-man] 
himself suffered purely humanly under the unrecognizability.19 
 
Kierkegaard describes this dynamic as 
 
…a strange kind of dialectic: that he, omnipotent, binds himself and 
does it so omnipotently that he actually feels bound, suffers under 
the consequence of his loving and free decision to become an 
individual human being––to that degree there was earnestness in his 
becoming an actual human being.20 
 
In these passages, Kierkegaard makes it clear that the God-man subjects himself 
to human suffering in a way that really is caught up in the suffering of creation. 
This is possible because with ‘everything divinely in his power’, Christ is free ‘to 
suffer humanly, every moment divinely capable of changing everything.’21 In other 
words, the God-man suffers omnipotently––a perspective reminiscent of the 
Cyrilline view that the incarnate Word suffered impassibly.22 For Cyril, as Paul 
Gavrilyuk writes, 
 
                                                 
19 PC, 131-32. 
20 PC, 132. 
21 JP 4, 4610. Drawing on Mt. 26.53, Kiekregaard asserts ‘that [Christ], the abased one, 
at all times had it in his power to ask his Father in heaven to send legions of angels to him 
to avert this most terrible thing [his death]’. PC, 177. 
22 For further discussion of the notion that Christ suffered impassibly, see Thomas 
Weinandy, ‘Cyril and the Mystery of the Incarnation’, in Thomas Weinandy and Daniel 
Keating (eds.), The Theology of Cyril of Alexandria (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2003), 49-53. 
…both qualified divine impassibility and qualified divine possibility 
were necessary for a sound theology of incarnation. That affirmation 
of the impassibility was a way of protecting the truth that the one who 
became incarnate was truly God. Admitting a qualified passibility 
secured the point that God truly submitted himself to the conditions 
of the incarnation.23 
 
Like Cyril, the words of Phil 2.5-11 resonate throughout Kierkegaard’s depiction of 
Jesus Christ. For example, in one of his upbuilding discourses, he writes: 
 
He who was equal with God took the form of a lowly servant, he would 
command legions of angels, indeed could command the world’s 
creation and its destruction, he walked about defenceless; he who 
had everything in his power surrendered all power and could not even 
do anything for his beloved disciples but could only offer them the 
very same conditions of lowliness and contempt… if this is not self-
denial, what then is self-denial.24 
 
What does Kierkegaard mean by self-denial here? He does not think that the Son 
(the one ‘who was equal with God’) denies his essential divinity (or Godness) by 
taking the form of a lowly servant.25 Rather, God chooses to express his power 
through a powerlessness that we might not naturally associate with God. 
Moreover, for Kierkegaard, God cannot express his power through an apparent 
“powerlessness” without assuming a new form. God reveals himself in an act that 
is not characterized by the kind of transcendent glory that characterizes the other 
                                                 
23 Paul Gavrilyuk, The Suffering of the Impassible God (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), 150. 
24 Kierkegaard, Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, ed. and trans. Howard V. and Edna 
H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), 224-5. Kierkegaard also writes, 
Jesus Christ ‘learned obedience and was obedient, obedient in everything, obedient in 
giving up everything (the glory that he had before the foundation of the world was laid), 
obedient in doing without everything (even that on which he could lay his head), obedient 
in taking everything upon himself (the sin of humankind), obedient in suffering everything 
(the guilt of humankind), obedient to subjecting himself to everything in life, obedient in 
death.’ Kierkegaard, Christian Discourses, ed. and trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 85. 
25 Reflecting on John 12:32, Kierkegaard refers to the uplifted one as ‘God’s only begotten 
Son, our Lord, who from eternity was with God, was God, came to the world, then 
ascended into heaven, where he now sits at the Father’s right hand, glorified with the 
glory he has before the world was.’ PC, 222. 
acts of God which we read about elsewhere in Scripture. When ‘divine 
glory…take[s] on a lowly form’,26 God gives himself to relate personally to human 
beings in a new way, such that there would seem to be a sense in which the 
incarnation involves ‘something new for God.’27 Indeed, Kierkegaard is willing to 
go so far as to say that ‘God suffers’ in and through the humanity of Jesus Christ.28 
What we see here, in the words of Cyril, is a paradoxical understanding of Jesus 
Christ as one ‘who as God transcends suffering, suffered humanly in his flesh.’29 
For Kierkegaard, this is possible by way of an omnipotence that ‘can withdraw itself 
at the same time it gives itself away’.30  
 
The Changelessness of God 
 
There are a number of things that Kierkegaard has to say about the nature of God 
without getting caught up with systematic debates about the extent of God’s 
attributes, their mutual compatibility, their precise definition etc. For him, such 
debates tend to go beyond the remit of human theologizing, which, he believed, 
should be very slow to advance an overly systematic doctrine of God or an overly 
rigid description of God’s attributes––especially if such description risks getting in 
the way of affirming positions that he took to be central to Christian orthodoxy. It 
was with this attitude that he approaches the changelessness of God. He was clear 
that there was an important sense in which we need to maintain divine 
changelessness. At the same time, he does not commit himself to a doctrine of 
this attribute that stops him, for example, from being able to affirm what he 
wanted to say about the way in which God involves himself in the history of 
creation. 
The place where Kierkegaard gives particular attention to divine 
changelessness is in his sermon on ‘The Changelessness of God’, where he offers 
                                                 
26 Kierkegaard, Eighteen Upbuilding Discourses, ed. and trans. by Howard V. and Edna 
H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990, 303. 
27 Paul R. Sponheim, ‘Relational Transcendence in Divine Agency’, in International 
Kierkegaard Commentary: Practice in Christianity, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, GA: 
Mercer University Press, 2004), 53. 
28 JP 4, 4610. Kierkegaard also notes that Christ entered into the world in order to suffer’. 
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, ed. and trans. 
Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 597. 
29 Cyril of Alexandria, De symbolo, 24, in L.R. Wickham, Cyril of Alexandria: Selected 
Letters (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983), 123. 
30 JP 2, 1251. 
a reflection on James 1.17-21, particularly verse 17: ‘Every good and perfect gift 
is from above and comes down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no 
variableness or shadow or turning.’31 The message of this sermon closely 
corresponds to its title, and it would be hard to walk away from this sermon 
thinking that he was willing to call into question the immutability of God. For 
example, in the opening prayer of this sermon, he refers to God as the ‘Changeless 
One, whom nothing changes!’32 He then goes on to write: ‘no variation touches 
[God], not even the shadow of variation; in unchanged clarity, he, the Father of 
lights, is eternally unchanged.’33  
At the same time, in his opening prayer, he also writes: ‘you who in infinite 
love let yourself be moved, may this our prayer also move you to bless it so that 
the prayer may change the one who is praying into conformity with your 
changeless will, you Changeless One!’34 Here, he does not suggest that God 
changes who he essentially is or what he essentially wills. Yet he does 
acknowledge that God allows himself to be moved by human prayers. For 
Kierkegaard, God is always free to interact with that which he creates––albeit 
without the kind of emotional changeableness that characterizes human 
interaction. In recognizing this, he does not hold to a diminished view of God’s 
immutability but simply allows his understanding of God’s immutability to be 
shaped by what he sees in Scripture, particularly in the person of Jesus Christ––
even if this offends some of our immediate expectations about what God should 
be like. 
Again, Kierkegaard does not develop a systematic account of how exactly 
we can align divine changelessness with the various accounts we have of God 
interacting with creation. Not possessing divine changelessness himself, and not 
having access to it, he does not think that the complexities of divine providence 
are within the purview of human understanding. Indeed, he was highly critical of 
those who sought to think abstractly about God’s changelessness, who enter into 
a ‘a phantom-battle about the predicates of God’.35 When emphasizing God’s 
changelessness, he was primarily concerned with recognizing that God is 
                                                 
31 Kierkegaard, The Moment and Late Writings, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna 
H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998) (hereafter M), 263-82. 
32 M, 269. 
33 M, 272. 
34 M, 269. 
35 JP 2, 1348. 
unchangeably good, true, and loving etc. He did not view God’s changelessness as 
‘an abstract something’––like the changelessness of the sun.36 If God existed in 
this way, then he does not think there would be any possibility of a reciprocal 
relationship with God, involving both parties. For him, God is a free subject whose 
personal activity expresses God’s changeless truth in a way that is lively and 
animated in ways that prevent it from being conceptualized by human reason. And, 
in his changelessness, he believes that Scripture presents God as one who freely 
chooses to be responsive to creation.  
 So, in a certain respect, Kierkegaard would seem to think that the actual 
interactions God has with creation make a difference to God––especially in the 
case of the incarnation. Apart from creation, God does not share a relationship 
with that which is not God, and so clearly does find union with that which is not 
God. On the other side, apart from the incarnation, creation is not fully united with 
God in the way that is established in Christ. This again means that there is 
something entirely unique to the person of Christ––that is, again, absolutely 
paradoxical to human reason. At the same time, Kierkegaard does not think that 
such change makes a difference to who God essentially is. This means that, 
paradoxically, the unchangeable God is able to bring about change in his 
relationship with creation. 
 
The Role of Paradoxical Christology 
 
As we saw in the previous two sections, Kierkegaard’s paradoxical theology allowed 
him to maintain views about God’s relationship to creation that are beyond what 
we can comprehend with our limited minds. However, given his commitment to 
the paradoxicality of Christianity, this did not concern him in the least. Before 
turning to consider the role of Kierkegaard’s paradoxical Christology, it is important 
to be clear that the role that paradox played in his thought was not simply 
functional but was also theological––it was grounded in his understanding of who 
God is and who we are before God. At the same time, while his approach was not 
designed for the sake of addressing the problems he saw in Denmark, he did see 
this theology as providing a firm basis for enabling him to diagnose and address 
some of the key problems he saw in his surrounding culture. 
                                                 
36 JP 2, 1348. 
What were the problems he faced? In his later writings, Kierkegaard sought 
to challenge the kind of abstract speculation about Jesus Christ that distracted 
persons from relating to Christ in a way that would lead them into lives of 
discipleship. For him, this was not only a problem in his immediate context. It is 
one that hinders much of the history of Christological reflection, right from the 
very beginning when the Pharisees were blinded by their theologistic analysis of 
Jesus Christ––an analysis that was undergirded by the reigning theological 
orthodoxies. In Kierkegaard’s own day, this problem expressed itself in a proclivity 
to think about Christianity in purely abstract terms that distracted Christians from 
responding to Christ’s call to discipleship.37 This contributed to the illusion that the 
heart of Christianity was to be found in doctrinal statements, which turned 
Christianity into a religion for the elite and the bourgeois. Not only did this move 
take Christianity out of the hands of the poor and marginalized of society; it turned 
Christianity against them––it turned Christianity into a luxury that was barely 
within their means. He writes: 
 
Theory and doctrine are a fig leaf, and by means of this fig leaf a 
professor or clergyman looks so portentous that it is terrifying. And 
just as it is said of the Pharisees that they not only do not enter into 
the kingdom of heaven themselves but even prevent others from 
entering, so also the professor prevents the unlearned man by giving 
him the idea that it depends on doctrine and that consequently he 
must try to follow along in a small way. This, of course, is to the 
professor's interest, for the more important the doctrine becomes, the 
more important the professor becomes as well, and the more splendid 
his occupation and the greater his reputation. Generally speaking, the 
professor’s and pastor’s spiritual counselling is a hoax, for it is 
calculated to prevent people from entering the kingdom of heaven.38 
 
For Kierkegaard, there is a tendency in Christian scholarship to become so 
preoccupied with transposing Christian truths ‘into the sphere of the intellectual’ 
that they ignore the “Truth” who stands right in front of them, calling them to 
                                                 
37 KJN 1, 247. 
38 JP 4, 3870. 
leave their nets and follow him.39 For him, this points to a failure to recognize the 
essence of Christianity. As he saw it, where there is no Christian living, there is no 
Christian understanding. ‘[W]hen the truth is the way, being the truth is a life––
and this is indeed how Christ speaks of himself: I am the Truth and the way and 
the Life.’40 Therefore, if a particular kind of theological discourse risks being 
detrimental to the liveliness of a person’s discipleship, then something has gone 
very wrong.  
At various points in his writings, Kierkegaard became so caught up in his 
critique of the intellectualization of Christianity that he ended up being critical of 
any amount of reflection on Christian doctrine. Indeed, in one journal entry, he 
goes so far as to write: ‘I do not have a stitch of doctrine—and doctrine is what 
people want. Because doctrine is the indolence of aping and mimicking for the 
learner, and doctrine is the way to sensate power for the teacher, for doctrine 
collects men.’41 From what we have seen (and could see), he clearly had more 
than a stitch of doctrine, and he would not have wanted to advance a theology 
that fell out of line with Christian orthodoxy. Nevertheless, he did not think that 
further theological digging and probing should have been the priority that it was 
for theologians in Denmark. For him, in his particular context, there was no 
immediate need for so much attention to be given to “progress” on this front––in 
many respects, he seemed to think that we would be fine with nothing more than 
a kind of mere Christianity, to use Richard Baxter’s phrase.42 Indeed, in his view, 
the ongoing speculative pursuit of theological progress was leading to digression.  
One of the prime targets that Kierkegaard had in his sights, was the 
systematic Christology of Hegelianism. To oversimplify matters, this project 
attempted to make progress in Christology by trying to work out the logic of the 
incarnation by way of philosophical mediation (Mediering) or reconciliation (à la 
Hegel)––a form of mediation that sought to hold the divine and human together 
within a single system of human understanding.43 Under this project, for 
Kierkegaard, the person of Jesus Christ came to be reduced to (or subsumed 
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under) a systematic doctrine for intellectual stimulation. For him, this could not be 
more backward. Rather than seeing Christology as a witness that directs our 
attention to Jesus Christ, the person of Jesus Christ was being treated as a person 
who directs our attention to speculation over Christological puzzles––a pursuit that 
kept systematic theologians in business. This led him to emphasize that ‘it is not 
a doctrine that [Jesus Christ] communicates to you––no he gives you himself.’44 
He also writes: 
 
The Savior of the world, our Lord Jesus Christ, did not come to the 
world in order to bring a doctrine; he never lectured. Since he did not 
bring a doctrine, he did not try by way of reasons to prevail upon 
anyone to accept the doctrine, nor did he try to authenticate it by 
proofs. His teaching was really his life, his existence…[O]ne does not 
become a Christian by hearing something about Christianity, by 
reading something about it, by thinking about it, or, while Christ was 
living, by seeing him once in a while or so by going and staring at him 
all day long. No, a setting [Bestedelse] (situation) is required––
venture a decisive act; the proof does not precede but follows, is in 
and with the imitation that follows Christ.’45 
 
For Kierkegaard, God speaks a person to creation, and that person bespeaks God. 
This person is to be loved and followed, and it is by so doing that a person comes 
to know God. In this relationship, Jesus Christ must not be reduced to a set of 
human ideas or principles without losing out on the essential truth of who he is.46 
Kierkegaard’s particular focus on the person of Jesus Christ is not one that is often 
associated with him and it has come to be more commonly associated with Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer and his emphasis on the importance of the “who” question. 
In his lectures on Christology, Bonhoeffer stresses that when we approach 
Jesus Christ, we must resist the temptation to reduce the person of Jesus Christ 
to our own Christologies––ideas that are contained within human systems of 
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understanding. When Christ is displaced by Christology, our commitment to Christ 
becomes fixated on “how” questions that become trapped within the immanent 
sphere of human understanding. We focus on such questions about “how is it 
possible for Jesus Christ to exist?”. As a result, Christ becomes an object that is 
defined by human demands, rather the one who himself demands the 
transformation of human beings. This makes it all too easy for us to become caught 
up in pursuing and conforming to our own systematic ideas about Christology; 
concepts and principles that do not transform our lives in the way that the person 
of Jesus Christ does. Accordingly, Bonhoeffer stressed that we need to approach 
Jesus Christ by asking “who are you?”, which is a question that recognizes the 
‘otherness of the other.’47 As we ask this question, we are called to look beyond 
ourselves to the risen and ascended Jesus Christ.  
The connection between Bonhoeffer’s Christology and Kierkegaard’s is a 
result of the decisive impact that Kierkegaard had on Bonhoeffer. When Bonhoeffer 
emphasizes the “who” question, he is channeling Kierkegaard.48 By so doing, he 
gave Kierkegaard’s Christology a voice that it had not found from Kierkegaard 
himself, which is why this emphasis is normally associated with Bonhoeffer.49 Why 
was it that Kierkegaard was unable to give this position a greater hearing? Why 
did his message find so much more gravitas under they conveyance of Bonhoeffer? 
There are many possible reasons for this, but there is one in particular that is 
worth mentioning here. Arguably, Kierkegaard’s greatest weakness was his 
tendency to overstate his case, and, as we have already seen, this was a particular 
problem when it came to his critique of Christian doctrine. The disdain he had for 
theology in Denmark, particularly in his later life, did not do him any favors, and 
made it difficult for him to be taken seriously. Simultaneously, and partly because 
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of his particular tack, Kierkegaard’s theology was overshadowed by the likes of 
Hans Lassen Martensen who, Kierkegaard comments, ‘sits there arranging a 
system of dogmatics’ ‘[w]hile the whole of existence is disintegrating.’50 
What does this have to do with the role of Kierkegaard paradoxical 
Christology? First, at risk of being repetitive, it is worth reiterating that 
Kierkegaard’s Christology relies heavily on the Christian tradition. Indeed, his very 
use of paradoxical Christology calls into question the extent of his critique of 
Christian doctrine.51 At the same time, his paradoxical Christology also stressed 
the inability of human understanding to grasp the logic of the incarnation: to know 
how we might hold together the propositions “Jesus Christ is fully human” and 
“Jesus Christ is fully God.” It therefore called for a halt to overly speculative 
approaches to Christology––to what we might call the quest for the incarnate Jesus 
(a quest to discover the hidden intricacies of the incarnation).52 For him, the logic 
of the incarnation is to be believed and confessed, by faith: ‘the divine and the 
human have to be believed together, something only faith is capable of doing’.53 
Christology, therefore, is not a venture in problem-solving: a project wherein 
scholars try to make the incarnation fit into a human system of logic. He writes: 
 
To believe is to believe the divine and human together in Christ. To 
comprehend him [God] is to comprehend his life humanly. But to 
comprehend his life humanly is so far from being more than believing 
that it means to lose him if there is not believing in addition, since his 
life is what it is for faith, the divine-human. I can understand myself 
in believing… but comprehend faith or comprehend Christ, I cannot. 
On the contrary, I can understand that to be able to comprehend his 
life in every respect is the most absolute and also the most 
blasphemous misunderstanding.54  
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 Christology, for Kierkegaard, is the study of the first-order logic (or Logos) who 
makes sense of our humanity by reconciling us into faithful relationship with God. 
Once a person is halted from trying to exceed their ability to systematise Christ 
for themselves––upon recognising the absolute paradoxicality of Jesus Christ––
then one is able to focus on the more important task at hand: following and 
imitating Jesus Christ, and thereby growing in one’s loving and faithful devotion to 
Christ. 
One of the problems and ironies with paradoxical presentations of Jesus 
Christ, however, is that they can incite the very speculation they seek to subvert–
–paradoxes are, after all, apparent contradictions that are prone to be disputed. 
The curious and controlling nature of fallen human reason is such that it is stubborn 
about letting go of the desire to see theological matters explained in terms that 
satisfy human systematic frameworks––that satisfy our “how” questions.55 As 
such, paradoxical Christology has a tendency to beg “how” questions about the 
union between Christ’s divinity and humanity. The history of such projects, 
Kierkegaard notes, have been fraught with confusion: 
 
In the first period of Christendom, when even aberrations bore an 
unmistakeable mark of one’s nevertheless knowing what the issue 
was, the fallacy with respect to the God-man was either that in one 
way or another the term “God” was taken away (Ebionitism and the 
like) or the term “man” was taken away (Gnosticism). In the entire 
modern age, which so unmistakeably bears the mark that it does not 
even know what the issue is, the confusion is something different and 
far more dangerous. By way of didacticism, the God-man has been 
made into the speculative unity of God and man sub specie aeterni 
[under the aspect of eternity] or made visible in that nowhere-to-be-
found medium of pure being, rather than that the God-man is the 
unity of being God and an individual human being in a historically 
actual situation. Or Christ has been abolished altogether, thrown out 
and his teaching taken over, and finally he is almost regarded as one 
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regards an anonymous writer: the teaching is the principle thing, is 
everything.56 
 
As this passage suggests, systematic approaches to Christology have led to: (1) 
zero-sum games between Christ’s human and divine nature; (2) the development 
a ‘speculative unity of God and man’ that directs our attention to an overarching 
realm within which God and humanity are united; (3) the setting aside of the 
person of Christ to focus on his teachings. What is Kierkegaard’s fourth option? On 
the one hand, for Kierkegaard, we cannot teach persons to comprehend Christ in 
the way that we can teach persons how to solve philosophical problems.57 ‘[Christ] 
knows that no human being can comprehend him, that the gnat that flies into the 
candlelight is not more certain of destruction than the person who wants to try to 
comprehend him or what is united in him: God and man.’58 On the other hand, we 
do need to come to know him because ‘he is the Savior, and for no human being 
is there salvation except through him.’59  
What Kierkegaard’s paradoxical Christology seeks to direct our attention 
towards is the person rather than a doctrine––someone to be loved and respected, 
not simply observed and speculated over. So he does not seek to direct our 
attention to a paradox; again, his insistence on the paradox seeks to halt 
conversations that speculate over what we cannot (and should not try to) 
comprehend. Faith in Christ ‘does not consist in choosing either one side of the 
contrast [his lowliness/humanity or his loftiness/divinity] but in choosing a unity 
of both sides.’60 It consists in believing and trusting in a person and giving him the 
kind of attention that was given to him by his apostles: 
 
In the conversation of the apostles one continually gets the 
impression that they had been personally in the company of Christ, 
had lived with him as with a human being. Therefore their speech is 
very human, although they never do forget the infinite qualitative 
difference between the God-man and other human beings.61 
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 By giving primacy to the person of Christ, Kierkegaard directs our attention to the 
one who can be known personally within the limits of our creaturely mode of 
reference, so that we can relate to him in a way that is comparable to the way in 
which the apostles related to Jesus Christ. To be clear, this is not simply to turn 
attention to Christ’s teaching because, for Kierkegaard, what makes the teaching 
so important is the one from whom they come, and, therefore, the one to whom 
they witness.62 Kierkegaard notes that if ‘someone says that Christ’s life is 
extraordinary because of the results, then this is again a mockery of God because 
Christ’s life is the in-itself-extraordinary.’63 He then adds: ‘The emphasis does not 
fall upon the fact that a human being has lived. Only God can attach that much 
importance to himself, so that the fact that he has lived is infinitely more important 
than all the results that are registered in history.’64 
 
The Paradoxical Mediator 
 
…there is one God, there is also one mediator between God and 
humankind, Christ Jesus, himself human. (1 Tim. 2:5) 
 
It is hard to think of another verse from Scripture that does a better job of 
capturing Kierkegaard’s Christological vision than 1 Tim. 2:5. Yet he never cites 
this verse and he only rarely refers to the mediation of Jesus Christ. Why is this? 
There are a number of major theological themes that receive surprisingly little 
attention in Kierkegaard’s writings and, much of the time, it is because of the way 
that these themes had come to be associated with the Hegelian philosophy of 
which he was so critical. The Holy Spirit, the Trinity, the mediation of Christ, 
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participation in Christ, reconciliation (and we could go on) receive very little 
mention in his writings because of the way they connoted Hegelian theology. The 
particular difficulty with these terms was that they were being used by 
Hegelianism to synthesise “God” with humanity. Such synthesising, for 
Kierkegaard, was a cornerstone of the cultural Christianity of Denmark. It not only 
allowed but encouraged the Gospel to be chopped and changed to fit its particular 
milieu. 
One of the ways in which Kierkegaard pushed back against the synthesizing 
of God and humanity was by insisting ‘that there is an infinite qualitative difference 
between God and man.’65 Moreover, he goes so far as to suggest that there is a 
sense in which ‘we cannot speak of fellowship with God, and man cannot endure 
the fellowship, cannot endure continually having only the impression of God's 
presence.’66 This statement can seem quite out of place for Kierkegaard––who was 
highly committed to emphasizing the decisiveness of a loving relationship with 
God. One could put these words down to rhetorical flourish, especially since they 
appear in the form of a journal entry. However, it would also be possible to 
interpret this passage in a way that is entirely consistent with his theological vision. 
For Kierkegaard, direct or immediate fellowship with God, in all his transcendent 
glory, really is beyond the scope of human possibility. The infinite qualitative 
difference ‘always remains’.67 So, the relationship with God requires the mediation 
of the Son. Drawing on John 6.45, he writes: ‘God directs us to the Son, to the 
Mediator’ and pronounces: ‘In the Mediator I can be a father to you.’68 And by 
assuming human flesh, the eternal Son mediates God to humanity, thereby 
allowing human beings to know God according to the limits of their finitude. In this 
way, ‘the glory is not directly known as glory but, just the reverse, is known by 
inferiority, debasement’.69 In the person of Christ, the glory of God is mediated to 
the lowliness of the world––to a world that is unable to contain God in his 
transcendent glory.  
Through the mediation of Christ, persons are to be delivered into a life of 
fellowship with God in which the infinite qualitative difference no longer functions 
as an alienating difference. The person of Christ enables there to be 
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correspondence between God and human beings across the divide. In Christ, God 
creates a real yet mediated relationship between human beings and God as beings 
who are infinitely qualitatively different from one another but who are also fully 
united with one another in Christ.70 For Kierkegaard, we relate to God by sharing 
in a faithful relationship with the person of Jesus Christ: the God-human, in whom 
there is both mediation between God and humanity and reconciliation from the sin 
that totally alienates us from God. 
Again, however, Kierkegaard hesitated to use the language of the mediation 
to talk about God’s relationship to creation. Instead, he primarily chose to talk 
about Christ’s mediatorial role in terms of his paradoxicality. Rather than simply 
focusing on the way that Christ created unity between God and humanity, which 
risked Hegelian connotations, he presented Jesus Christ as one who 
incomprehensibly and unsettlingly brings God and humanity together, without 
confusing the creator-creature distinction. For him, it was a paradoxical 
Christology that was best able to draw attention to this message. The presentation 
of Jesus Christ as absolute paradox sought to bring a halt to the systematic and 
depersonalizing attempts to comprehend the logic of Jesus Christ and, instead, 
focus attention on the person who invites us to come and follow him. However, as 
soon as the language of paradox has served this purpose, it should be dropped 
from discussion. From then on, the discussion should be left to be attentive to the 
primary theologian (or God-talker): Jesus Christ, God’s Word made flesh. It is in 
this way, to return to our opening quote from Torrance, that come to know ‘the 
nearness, the impact of God in all his Majesty and Godness upon man.’71 
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